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Introduction 
The early warning signs are often unclear. You may feel nauseous, 
clammy, short of breath after a particularly difficult workout. Then, as 
a severe chest pain migrates through your shoulders and to your jaw, 
its source becomes unmistakable; it is a heart attack. Cholesterol plaque 
obstructed coronary blood flow, which deprived your heart of much-
needed oxygen. And despite daily exercise and a low-fat diet, 
predisposition to high cholesterol may be imminent if left untreated.1 
 
1. For more information regarding heart health, see Heart Attack and Stroke 
Symptoms, Am. Heart Assoc., https://www.heart.org/en/about-us/heart-
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Cardiovascular disease kills more than 600,000 Americans each 
year.2 That number accounts for one quarter of all deaths in the United 
States.3 To combat heart disease, or any chronic disease, at-risk 
individuals take prescription medications daily.4 And given the 
unsettling trend of pharmaceutical price increases, Americans often 
budget their expenses around prescription costs.5 
Since 1998, Abbott has sold fenofibrate, a prescription drug used to 
treat high cholesterol levels, under the brand name Tricor.6 Although 
Tricor’s original patents expired years ago, Abbott dominated the 
fenofibrate drug market, accounting for three-quarters of all fenofibrate 
sales in 2009.7 Despite several attempts, generic versions of fenofibrate, 
which studies suggested would save consumers 700 million dollars per 
year, remained unavailable throughout the early 2000s.8 Through a 
series of minor reformulations and marketing tactics, Abbott main–
tained its market share without providing measurable benefits to 
patients who were prescribed Tricor for high cholesterol.9 
As public salience of such tactics increases, Abbott’s behavior 
appears to be the rule, not the exception.10 The intersection of patent 
law and drug-safety regulation enables pharmaceutical companies to 
engage in anticompetitive behavior that deprives the public from 
 
attack-and-stroke-symptoms [https://perma.cc/M2R4-W65B] (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2020). 
2. Heart Disease Fact Sheet, Ctr. Disease Control, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
 heartdisease/docs/ConsumerEd_HeartDisease.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
 85HN-FT3U].  
3. Id. 
4. See generally Medications Used to Treat Heart Failure, Am. Heart 
Assoc., https://www.heart.org/en/health-topics/heart-failure/treatment-
options-for-heart-failure/medications-used-to-treat-heart-failure [https:// 
 perma.cc/CQ9N-D67L] (last reviewed May 31, 2017).  
5. See, e.g., Carolyn Y. Johnson, Why Treating Diabetes Keeps Getting 
More Expensive, Wash. Post (Oct. 31, 2016, 10:25 PM), https://www 
 .washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/31/why-insulin-prices-
have-kept-rising-for-95-years/ [https://perma.cc/26YF-FB4J].  
6. Nicholas S. Downing et al., How Abbott’s Fenofibrate Franchise Avoided 
Generic Competition, 172 Arch Intern Med. 724, 725 (2012). 
7. Id. at 729. 
8. Id. at 725. 
9. Id. 
10. See, e.g., Emily Willingham, Why Did Mylan Hike EpiPen Prices 400%? 
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affordable prescription medication.11 But before attempting to solve 
that problem, it is important to find and understand its source. 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,12 
colloquially known as the “Hatch-Waxman Act” (for its congressional 
sponsors), inserted America’s patent system into the core of the 
pharmaceutical industry. Enacted in 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
sought to accomplish two main goals: (1) to lower drug costs by 
promoting generic market entry; and (2) to incentivize brand-name 
drug manufacturers to create innovative pharmaceutical products.13 To 
the first end, the Hatch-Waxman Act lightened the regulatory burden 
for generic drugs seeking the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) 
approval while simultaneously encouraging generic manufacturers to 
challenge pioneer drug patents that would otherwise prevent generic 
competition.14 Pioneer drug makers were given the benefit of a “Patent 
Term Readjustment” to lengthen the effective patent life of pioneer 
pharmaceutical compounds, extending their patent-provided legal 
monopoly.15 
The Hatch-Waxman Act has remained basically unchanged since it 
was first enacted over three decades ago.16 Notably, Congress and the 
FDA have not addressed many important issues created by the 
statutory scheme.17 In turn, pioneer pharmaceutical manufacturers can 
manipulate that scheme to extend pioneer-drug-market exclusivity.18 
This strategic gaming of the Hatch-Waxman Act takes shape in various 
 
11. See Downing et al., supra note 6, at 725–26.  
12. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 
(2012), 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2012)). 
13. See Ashlee B. Mehl, The Hatch-Waxman Act and Market Exclusivity for 
Generic Drug Manufacturers: An Entitlement or an Incentive?, 81 Chi-
Kent L. Rev. 649, 650 (2006); Raymond J. Prince, Pay-for-Delay: How 
Brand-Name and Generic Pharmaceutical Drug Companies Collude and 
Cost Consumer Billions, 68 S.C. L. Rev. 689 (2017). 
14. Mehl, supra note 13, at 653–54. 
15. Id. at 654.  
16. See Alyson L. Wooten, FDA’s Hatch-Waxman Regulations Get a Long 
Overdue Update, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/ 
 library/detail.aspx?g=587095cc-6563-4d88-bcc4-0cf1ddcf1b56 (explaining 
that, prior to a new set of regulations enacted in 2016, the Hatch-Waxman 
Act regime had been “largely unchanged for over a decade”) [https://perma 
 .cc/TB99-P48H]. 
17. See infra Part IV (discussing Hatch-Waxman and its defects). 
18. See generally Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming the Hatch-Waxman System: 
How Drug Makers Exploit the Law to Maintain Monopoly Power in the 
Prescription Drug Market, 29 Notre Dame J. Leg. 21 (2003).   
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forms—whether by “evergreening” pioneer drug patents, creating 
“authorized generics,” or promoting reverse settlements19—and often 
amounts to wasteful “rent-seeking” behavior.20 
Unlike Hatch-Waxman’s relatively inert statutory scheme, the 
United States’ patent system is more dynamic now than ever. In 2011, 
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act21 (the “AIA”) introduced the 
most significant change in American patent law’s modern history. The 
AIA changed the United States from a “first-to-invent” system, to a 
“first-inventor-to-file” system.22 Not only did the AIA abrogate some 
uncertainty in the United States’ patent system, it also helped bring 
the United States into alignment with a majority of foreign patent 
systems.23 Moreover, the AIA introduced the inter partes review ( 
“IPR”), a type of post-grant opposition proceeding where individuals 
can challenge granted patents in an administrative tribunal at the 
United States Patent and Trade Office (USPTO or the “Patent 
Office”).24 IPR, as opposed to federal district court litigation, provides 
an expeditious means to determine the patentability of certain claims 
by mandating that the USPTO announces final disposition of the claims 
within eighteen months after instituting an IPR.25 In effect, IPR works 
as a policing mechanism to ensure that the USPTO does not grant legal 
monopolies through “bad patents.”26 
The importance of “good” patents is drastically understated.27 
Patent-law policy is germane to both utility and progress. Patents 
 
19. See infra Part IV(B). 
20. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. 
Legal Stud. 247, 251–52 (1994). 
21. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–390 (2012)). 
22. Lee Petheridge et al., America Invents, More or Less?, 160 U. Penn. L. 
Rev. 229, 230 (2012).  
23. Id. at 235–36.  
24. Id. at 234–35.   
25. For an overview of IPR, see generally 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012). 
26. As discussed in Part II, examiners at the USPTO determine the patentability 
of claims within a patent application. While these examiners may have 
technical expertise, human error attributes to some patents being granted 
erroneously. Thus, IPR serves as a check on errors incurred during the 
patent examination process. 
27. See, e.g., International IP Commercialization Council U.S.A. Chapter’s 
Symposium on Meeting the Challenges to America’s Economic Future, 67 
Cath. U. L. Rev. 605, 628 (2018) (Paul Michel, the former chief judge 
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, “surmise[d]” that “many 
. . . good patents are being invalidated at the PTAB.”).  
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incentivize procompetitive behavior, focusing on both downstream, ex 
post conduct and upstream, ex ante conduct to maximize utility for 
all.28 Patent law’s general utilitarian framework, though embodied in a 
uniform patent code, is not a “one-size-fits-all” regime.29 Rather, it 
embodies an incentives system that, while affecting each differently,30 
drives different industries all toward the same goals: advancing 
technology through invention, disseminating and disclosing new 
information, and securing innovative products for consumers.31 That is 
why Hatch-Waxman’s digression from nominally uniform patent law 
may also illuminate the Act’s defects.32 
This Note addresses how the Hatch-Waxman Act’s unforeseen 
consequences conflict with contemporary patent-law policy. Part II 
details the relationship between the history of the patent system, 
fundamental patent law concepts, and contemporary rules governing 
patent law. Part III introduces pharmaceutical regulation in the United 
States and discusses the Hatch-Waxman Act’s policy goals. Part III 
also explains the devices implemented by Hatch-Waxman to achieve its 
pronounced goals. Part IV describes Hatch-Waxman’s effect on the 
pharmaceutical industry, including the anticompetitive behavior it 
induces. Finally, Part V first discusses how the Hatch-Waxman Act 
contradicts the policies discussed in Part II. It then concludes by 
suggesting that the AIA may have paved a way for realigning Hatch-
Waxman with contemporary patent law policy. 
I. The Patent System 
A. The Fundamentals: Why We Patent 
Patent-law critics do not restrict their skepticism to pharmaceutical 
technology patents.33 Nor do all legal skeptics believe that 
pharmaceutical patents are problematic.34 The seemingly non-industry-
specific disdain for the patent system is derived from society’s 
 
28. See Daniel L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 
Va. L. Rev. 1575, 1586–87 (2003). 
29. Id. at 1578, 1581.  
30. Id. at 1580, 1675. 
31. See infra Part II(A) and accompanying text. 
32. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 28, at 1578–79. 
33. See generally Dam, supra note 20.  
34. Richard Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, The 
Atlantic (July 12, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/ 
 2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-patents-in-america/259725/ [https://perma 
 .cc/JQ4S-KJM9]. 
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reservations regarding monopolistic behavior.35 Section 2 of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act36 expressly punishes individuals who “mono–
polize, or attempt to monopolize,” trade or interstate commerce.37 This 
prohibition on monopolies is diametrically opposed to a patentee’s right 
to exclude, seemingly creating a patent–antitrust “paradox.”38 Yet, 
patent law first principles—often misunderstood and more-frequently 
misapplied—provide guidance for reconciling the apparent doctrinal 
impasse: patents confer legal monopolies, not economic ones.39 
Like other fundamental principles, patent-law doctrine has historic 
roots in the legal system. The Constitution’s Intellectual Property 
Clause gave Congress the power “[t]o promote the progress of science 
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors 
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”40 
Through this clause, the Framers recognized that an inventor’s 
“exclusive right” to his creations is fundamental.41 So the First Congress 
quickly codified this right, enacting the Patent Act of 1790 as its third 
piece of legislation.42 
In the following two centuries, Americans patented technology that 
led to the telegraph,43 airplanes,44 smartphones,45 and virtual-reality 
devices.46 And yet, despite rapid technological advances, the slow-
 
35. See T. Randolph Beard et. al., Quantifying the Cost of Substandard 
Patents: Some Preliminary Evidence, 12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 240, 243–
44 (2010). 
36. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)). 
37. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
38. Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 761, 762–63 (2002). 
39. Neel U. Sukhatme, Regulatory Monopoly and Differential Pricing in the 
Market for Patents, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1855, 1857 (2014).  
40. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 1, cl. 8. 
41. See, e.g., Rebecca A. Lindhorst, Two-Stepping Through Alice’s Wasteland 
of Patent-Eligible Subject Matter: Why the Supreme Court Should Replace 
the Mayo/Alice Test, 69 Case. W. Res. L. Rev. 731, 734–35 (2019); 
Gene Quinn, Patents, Copyrights and the Constitution, Perfect Together, 
IPWatchdog (Feb. 19, 2018) http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/02/19/ 
 patents-copyrights-constitution/id=93941/ [https://perma.cc/5KAF-DDSZ]. 
42. Craig A. Nard, The Law of Patents 20 (4th ed. 2016). 
43. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 64 (1853). 
44. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 821,393 (the Wright Brothers’ “flying machine”). 
45. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,479,949 (Apple’s iPhone). 
46. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,956,038. 
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handed legislature has done little to amend the law governing the 
proprietary nature of these discoveries. Indeed, there have been only 
three major amendments to the original patent act.47 This paucity of 
patent-related legislation exemplifies the patent system’s strength, not 
its perceived weakness.48 
Judge Giles S. Rich, who helped draft the modern patent statute, 
articulated the justification for an enduring patent code during his 
famous 1964 Kettering Award speech.49 “Before there were patents 
there were people,”50 Judge Rich explains, and three economic and 
philosophical principles defining the person–patent relationship. First, 
“[H]ave-[N]ots” covet what “[H]aves” possess.51 Second, without a 
patent system, the Have-Nots will copy the Haves if economically 
feasible.52 Third, and perhaps most importantly, a monopoly of an in-
demand good makes it possible for the monopoly owner to profit off 
that monopoly, which, absent demand, would be worthless.53 Moreover, 
Judge Rich defied the notion that monopolies are inherently bad; 
rather, a “[m]onopoly is mere power. It is what is done with it that 
makes it good or bad.”54 Indeed, Judge Rich recognized that monopolies 
often have been put to good uses.55 These axioms, which existed long 
before the Founders drafted the Intellectual Property Clause,56 reveal 
the source of the enduring patent statute: human behavior. For it is 
human behavior—not technological advancement—that dictates 
whether monopolies will have positive or negative effects. 
At its core, the patent system identifies the trouble presented by 
capitalizing information. Being inexhaustible and non-excludable,57 
 
47. See Nard, supra note 42, at 21–24 (explaining the history of the United 
States’ patent system). 
48. Id. at 6 (explaining that the patent code “can arguably be viewed as a 
common law enabling statute” which provides “ample room for courts to 
fill in” otherwise “elliptical” statutory provisions). 
49. Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by § 103 of 
the 1952 Patent Act, 14 Fed. Cir. B.J. 147 (2004). 
50. Id. at 149. 





56. Id. at 148–51, 153 (explaining his maxims via Biblical passages, Ancient-
Grecian philosophers, and the Victorian-era “Statute of Monopolies,” the 
precursor to colonial patent law). 
57. Nard, supra note 42, at 30 (adding that Thomas Jefferson once explained: 
“He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without 
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economists classify information as a public good.58 This creates issues of 
“free-riders,” or covetous Have-Nots, profiting from someone else’s 
creation. Put differently, absent a property right, an inventor would 
not be incentivized to derive a profit from his inventions. He would fear 
corporate competitors copying and industrializing the invention,  
against whom he would be unable to compete. Consequently, the 
inventor would not invent at all because the economic opportunity cost 
would exceed any profits he might gain by selling his invention.59 
Applying this logic ad infinitum, technological progress would stifle.60 
To this end, the predominant patent rationale—the “incentive to 
invent”61—justifies a patent system that allows inventors to “internalize 
[their] externalities.”62 That is, patents serve as vessels for inventors to 
profit (internalize) from their socially beneficial discoveries, now 
available to others (externalities). The opposite function, “externalizing 
internalities,” employs parallel reasoning: without a proverbial fence 
(patent) to protect his useful discoveries, the inventor cannot prevent 
copiers from pirating his ideas. He cannot recoup (externalize) his sweat 
equity (internalities) because the copier—who did not expend labor or 
resources to invent the invention—offers the stolen idea at a more 
consumer-friendly price.63 
Concomitant with the incentive-to-invent theory, the incentive to 
disclose views patent prosecution as part of a social contract.64 To 
obtain his limited monopoly, the inventor must disclose his discovery 
 
lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without 
darkening me.”). 
58. Id.  
59. This dilemma is known as “Arrow’s Information Paradox.” Michael J. 
Burstein, Exchanging Information without Intellectual Property, 91 Tex. 
L. Rev. 227, 228–29 (2012); see also Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare 
and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in The Rate and 
Direction of Inventive Activity 609 (1962). 
60. See Craig A. Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 
Ind. L.J. 759, 771 (1999) (“The two distinctive features of public goods—
inexhaustibility and nonexcludability—suggest that public goods will tend 
to be under produced, if produced at all, by the market.”). 
61. Nard, supra note 42, at 34. 
62. Harold Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 347, 350. 
63. Nard, supra note 42, at 34–35; see also Kenneth Dam, The Economic 
Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. Legal Stud. 247, 247 (1994) 
(defining the free-rider problem as an “appropriability problem” that 
hinders innovation). 
64. See Nard, supra note 42, at 35 (explaining that inventors must 
sufficiently disclose their inventions in return for patent rights). 
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to the public.65 Assuming inventors seek patent protection for their 
inventions immediately upon creation—thereby disclosing the invention 
to the public—the public gains access to new information more readily 
in a patent system.66 In turn, other inventors may develop further 
technological advancements from the newly revealed information.67 
Finally, the incentive to innovate—the theory with the most 
explicit economic rationale68—justifies patents as providing a means for 
commercialization.69 While the incentive to invent may encourage 
scientific advancement, innovation results when the invention reaches 
the consumer.70 Colloquially described as “from [lab] bench to bedside,” 
innovation is the culmination of research and development, marketing, 
manufacturing, and distribution.71 This theory dispels progress for 
progress’s sake; rather, it treats patents as a means for efficient 
coordination between various transacting parties.72 
B. The Modern Patent Statute: A Rich Vision for Incentive-Theory 
Jurisprudence 
As expressed in his Kettering Award speech, Judge Rich captured 
his patent-law philosophy in drafting the 1952 Patent Act.73 Patent 
applicants must provide the USPTO with a written description of their 
inventions that enables a person skilled in the relevant technology to 
 
65. See infra notes 75–90 and accompanying text. 
66. See Nard, supra note 42, at 35 (noting that trade-secrecy law contradicts 
the patent system’s disclosure function). 
67. See generally Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 621 (2010) (describing patents’ value in disseminating 
information). 
68. See Nard, supra note 42, at 36. 
69. See Joseph Schumpter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 83 
(1950) (delineating inventive activity from innovation, and positing that 
inventive activity is purely non-economic). 
70. Id. at 84. 
71. Constance E. Bagley & Christina D. Tvarno, Pharmaceutical Public-
Private Partnerships: Moving From the Bench to Bedside, 4 Harv. Bus. 
L. Rev. 373, 374 (2014). Burk and Lemley also recognize the “anticommons,” 
the theory that patenting creates innovation-inhibiting thickets. See Burk 
& Lemley, supra note 28, at 1611–12; see also Michael A. Heller, The 
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to 
Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621 (1998). 
72. Courts have long-understood the vital role that patents play in developing 
new technology, expressing hesitation to grant patents that are overly 
broad which would monopolize a set of ideas. See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 
56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854). 
73. Rich, supra note 49. 
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make and use the subject matter described in the application.74 
Following the written description, applicants must write “claims 
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter 
which the inventor . . . regards as the invention.”75 These claims must 
recite a novel, nonobvious, and useful invention.76 
1. The Patent Application and its Roles 
A patent application comprises three core features: a specification, 
one or more figures, and claims.77 The specification is a thesis-like 
description of the invention, generally providing context for the 
invention in view of the technology, which explains how to make or use 
the invention as further illustrated in the figures.78 Claims denote the 
proprietary boundaries of the invention—the “fence” which signals the 
invention’s scope—as disclosed in the patent application.79 
A specification that sufficiently describes the invention reinforces 
the incentive-to-disclose theory. Because the USPTO publishes patent 
applications eighteen months after filing,80 a sufficiently descriptive 
disclosure allows other skilled inventors to develop new technologies 
from the subject application’s teachings.81 Since applications rarely 
mature into grants within eighteen months,82 or ever,83 early publication 
leads to the public dissemination of new ideas.84 Further, an application 
 
74. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
75. Id. § 112(b). 
76. Id. §§ 101–03. 
77. Id. § 111(a). 
78. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,479,949 (Apple’s iPhone). 
79. See Nard, supra note 60, at 759 (“Patent law is about building fences. 
The demarcation of one’s proprietary interest is facilitated by requiring 
the inventor, when filing a patent application, to point out distinctly and 
with particularity what he regards as his invention.”). 
80. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2012). 
81. See Nard, supra note 42, at 119 and accompanying text. 
82. The USPTO takes an average of twenty-one months to grant a patent. 
See How Long Does it Take to Get A Patent?, Erikson Law Group, 
http://www.ericksonlawgroup.com/law/patents/patentfaq/how-long-does-
it-take-to-get-a-patent/ [https://perma.cc/6S5L-S4TG] (last visited Apr. 
25, 2020). 
83. Some estimate that 2.3% of patent filings (roughly 100,000 applications) 
become abandoned. Michael Gzybowski, IP in Depth: What Happens to 
Abandoned Patent Applications?, Ceramic Industry (Sept. 3, 2013), 
https://www.ceramicindustry.com/articles/93441-ip-in-depth-what-happens-
to-abandoned-patent-applications [https://perma.cc/H65F-6ZCD]. 
84. See Nard, supra note 42, at 91 and accompanying text. 
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that does not issue and becomes “abandoned” still retains value. As 
applicants engage in a negotiation with the USPTO to obtain patent 
protection, failure to commercialize, applicant insolvency, and other 
reasons entirely unrelated to the application’s disclosure value may 
justify abandonment.85 Abandoned applications still function as “prior-
art” references, which can be cited against future applicants during 
patent prosecution, and their publication enshrines information so that 
it is not lost to the inventor’s fading memory.86 Thus, disclosure, 
particularly “full, clear, concise” disclosure, preserves knowledge and 
consequently increases societal value.87 
When the USPTO decides to issue a patent, the claims become the 
focus of the patent system’s disclosure function.88 First, allowable claims 
“point out distinctly and with particularity” the subject-matter that 
circumscribes the patent’s scope.89 By sequestering the formerly 
intangible fruits of the patentee’s intellectual labors, well-defined claims 
provide notice of what the inventor owns and what remains available 
to the public, thus preventing rent-seeking behavior and wasteful, 
duplicative research.90 Second, claims must be sufficiently “enabled” by 
the specification so that one skilled in the art can make and use the 
claimed invention.91 Patent law’s enablement requirement “keep[s] 
claim scope on a leash,” preventing overreaching inventors from 
obtaining the exclusive right to something without fulfilling their 
disclosure duty.92 
 
85. See Gzybowski, supra note 83 (explaining that waiting time and costs 
often result in abandonment). 
86. See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854) (lamenting an 
over-broad claim: “when his patent expires, the public must apply to him 
to learn what it is”). See also Rich, supra note 49, at 147 (“The wrongly 
directed research that ends in a blind alley, if made known, may prevent 
another from making the same mistake.”). 
87. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
88. See generally Nard, supra note 60, at 761 n.14, 795 (discussing the claims’ 
important notice function and suggesting that patent law should readdress 
the need for clear claim scope). 
89. Id. at 759. 
90. Id. at 759–60. 
91. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
92. See Craig A. Nard, Legal Fictions and the Role of Information in Patent 
Law, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 1517, 1532 (2016).  
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2. A Vague Concept of Invention: Strong Patents and the Notion of Good 
Monopolies 
Novelty, nonobviousness, and utility are the sine quibus non of an 
invention’s patentability, and thus, the bedrock of the patent system.93 
Inventions that fulfill these three94 conditions are the ends which justify 
patent law’s means. That does not suggest that an invention’s 
patentability trumps the application requirements; quite the opposite: 
failing to satisfy either set of conditions bars the issuance of a patent.95 
Rather, a sufficiently disclosed discovery that is not novel, nonobvious, 
or useful provides no benefit to society.96 
Whether an invention affords a “benefit” presupposes utility. Put 
differently, an invention’s utility differs from its potential benefit 
because the former asks “does the invention operate as described?”97 
and the latter asks “what good does it accomplish?”98 An inoperable 
invention necessarily lacks utility, and therefore it does not provide any 
inherent benefit. Further, “benefit” is a subjective guideline to which 
patent law remains mostly indifferent.99 That said, a patent is not a 
“hunting license” under which inventors can delay others from 
developing nascent technologies.100 Finally, unlike with novelty and 
nonobviousness, applicants enjoy the presumption of utility, which 
requires the USPTO to provide affirmative evidence of non-utility by a 
preponderance of the evidence.101 
 
93. Rich, supra note 49, at 156–57.   
94. More patentability conditions exist, such as the subject-matter 
requirement, but these are the only three germane to this Note. See 
generally Lindhorst, supra note 41 (discussing the subject-matter 
requirement). 
95. 35 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).   
96. Rich, supra note 49, at 147, 158. 
97. See USPTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2164.07(b) 
(9th ed., rev. 2018) (discussing utility requirement) [hereinafter MPEP]; 
see also In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (creating the utility 
standard). 
98. This latter question was considered under Brenner v. Mason, 383 U.S. 
519, 534–35 (1966), but such a question is rarely analyzed by courts 
anymore. See MPEP, supra note 97, § 2107, for examination guidelines. 
99. Brenner, 383 U.S. at 532–33.   
100. Id. at 536.  
101. Cf. MPEP, supra note 97, § 2107. Nascent technologies suffer utility 
rejections because their fields are not sufficiently established to determine 
whether they will work. See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 521–22 (describing 
technology ultimately lacking beneficial utility). 
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A truly “novel” invention is one that has never existed as claimed 
in the subject application.102 Because humans have finite access to 
information, a “pure novelty” patent system cannot truly exist.103 For 
example, an inventor seeking a patent would not suffer lack-of-novelty 
issues from a hobbyist’s prior, identical creation made unbeknownst to 
the rest of the world.104 Instead, the Patent Office examiners determine 
novelty through prior-art references—typically previous patent 
applications, thesis papers, or other writings—which predate the 
invention’s creation or filing date.105 Novelty is a historically low bar;106 
the prior art must disclose each element or limitation recited in an 
application’s claims to bar patenting for lack of novelty.107 A four-legged 
chair would be novel in view of a three-legged chair, despite being 
otherwise identical. 
That four-legged chair, however, may be considered obvious in view 
of the three-legged prior art. Section 103 of the patent code mandates 
that “[a] patent . . . may not be obtained . . . if . . . the claimed 
invention as a whole would have been obvious [in view of the prior 
art] . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed 
invention pertains.”108 Thus, if a person having ordinary skill in the art 
(“PHOSITA”) would consider the difference between a four-legged 
chair and a three-legged chair “obvious,” then the four-legged chair 
could not be patented. 
Section 103 says very little about what makes novelty-defeating 
differences “obvious” to the invention as a whole.109 Nor does § 103 
define the hypothetical PHOSITA.110 Instead, courts and tribunals must 
struggle through patent-law precedent to reach obviousness 
determinations, which was precisely the legislative intent behind the 
 
102. Cf. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 495–98 (1851) (holding that 
a previously known but forgotten invention did not invalidate a patent 
for the same “invention” independently created several years later). 
103. Id. at 496–97.  
104. Id. at 496–98.   
105. See infra Parts II.B.2, II.C (AIA & novelty). 
106. Compare MPEP, supra note 97, § 2131 (“A claim is anticipated only if 
each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly 
or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”) (quoting 
Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 
1987)), with Nard, supra note 92, at 1525–26.  
107. See MPEP, supra note 97, § 2131 (listing novelty examination guidelines). 
108. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
109. Rich, supra note 49, at 160.   
110. Id. at 157–58.   
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statute.111 When determining obviousness, prior-art references provide 
the lens through which the PHOSITA looks. But first the court112 must 
determine the correct prior art, how it differs from the claimed 
invention, and what level of skill is “ordinary” in the relevant technical 
field.113 In determining “ordinary skill,” courts consider the inventor’s 
education level, the technology’s sophistication, and other similarly 
predicated contextual questions.114 The PHOSITA is a legal fiction, 
tooled by the legislator, which gives courts the necessary flexibility to 
reach obviousness conclusions.115 
There are countless other questions which § 103 raises but leaves 
for the courts to answer.116 And courts undoubtedly fail to properly 
delineate what “obvious” truly means.117 But obviousness’s vexatious 
nature, coupled with human error, do not undermine the patent 
system’s goal: to bring forth effort and reward those who succeed.118 
Independently required, patentability’s utility, novelty, and non–
obviousness conditions determine what we should patent; their 
collective justifications determine why.119  
To this end, Judge Rich provides the following illustrative historical 
accounts. In 1594, Galileo received a “privilege” for an irrigation 
system. Around the same time, the British monarch granted a 
monopoly to sell playing cards to one of her loyal supporters. Galileo’s 
“patent,” which he was entitled to monopolize, gave the public 
something novel—non-existent but for Galileo’s discovery. The 
Monarch’s subject achieved the opposite: his patent took from the 
 
111. Id. at 155–57.  
112. Patent Office examiners and administrative law judges, though not 
technically Article III judges, also make these decisions. For administrative 
ease, fact-finding determinations made by “courts” duly applies to the 
Patent Office. See generally MPEP, supra note 97 (patent-examination 
guidelines).  
113. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966). 
114. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256–57 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
115. See Nard, supra note 92, at 1525–27 (describing the PHOSITA as 
“omniscient” for having access to all prior-known art). 
116. K.S.R. Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) is the standard 
currently used to determine obviousness. See also MPEP, supra note 97, 
§§ 2141–2145 (providing various examination guidelines to support or 
overcome obviousness rejections). 
117. See, e.g., Daralyn Durie & Mark Lemley, A Realist Approach to the 
Obviousness of Inventions, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 989, 994–99 (2008) 
(describing judicial treatment of obviousness under § 103). 
118. Rich, supra note 49, at 147. 
119. Id. at 148, 156–57. 
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public.120 A “good” monopoly, therefore, must externalize something 
new for the monopolist to internalize its profits. 
Before Galileo’s time, the pre-biblical Greeks granted to whomever 
cooked a “peculiar” and “excellent dish” monopolies that forbade others 
from making the dish for a year. The Greeks provided the year-long 
monopolies with the explicit intention of incentivizing greater culinary 
arts. If the dishes did not satisfy the statutory “excellency,” the 
monopoly retained no value. And so long as the monopolies did not 
take anything from the public, Judge Rich did not seem troubled by 
their existence.121 To be sure, if the monopoly prevented others from 
refining the “peculiar” cooking method to create a palatable and worthy 
dish, the bad monopoly would intolerably stymie innovation. 
Finally, Judge Rich details the conception of nonobviousness that 
evolved from the United States’ own jurisprudence. In Hotchkiss v. 
Greenwood,122 the Supreme Court found that forming a doorknob by 
affixing a clay handle to a metal shank—a seemingly novel creation, 
despite both existing independently for centuries—lacked sufficient 
ingenuity to be a patentable improvement.123 Germane to its reasoning, 
the Court stated that using clay instead of metal was “the work of the 
skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.”124 Thus, patents were not 
to be granted upon modifications made by a businessman in the “matter 
of course.”125 To this end, obviousness protects against monopolizing 
modifications that would occur organically once the relevant prior art 
exists.126 Put differently, requiring nonobviousness accomplishes more 
than preventing a monopoly on something the public already has, it 
incentivizes “those inventions which would not be disclosed . . . but for 
the inducement of the patent.”127 
 
120. Id. at 152–53. 
121. Id. at 151–54.  
122. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851). 
123. In this context, “improvement” referred to the clay handle’s resistance to 
cracking or deformation commonly observed in metal handles at the time. 
Id. at 266–67. 
124. Id. at 267. 
125. Rich, supra note 49, at 154. 
126. Nard, supra note 42, at 329. 
127. Id. (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966)). 
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C. Patent System Failures and the Role of the America Invents Act 
Recent legislation, namely the AIA,128 has brought the 1952 Patent 
Act into the twenty-first century by recognizing the need for a more 
unitary patent system in a global economy. In passing the AIA, 
Congress implemented legislation that not only aligned the United 
States’ patent system with World Trade Organization member 
countries,129 but also addressed dissonance between normative patent 
law under the 1952 Act and its underlying policy. Namely, the AIA 
transitioned the United States from a “first-to-invent” to a “first-
inventor-to-file” patent system.130 The AIA also created a post-grant 
oppositional IPR proceeding, where a third party can challenge patent 
claims as invalid for lacking novelty or nonobviousness.131 
Under the 1952 Act, an inventor was entitled to a patent unless the 
invention was “known or used by others . . . before the invention 
thereof.”132 While the first filer of a patent application was presumed to 
be the inventor, that presumption was rebuttable upon a showing that 
the second applicant: (1) first conceived the invention; and (2) worked 
diligently in reducing the invention to practice.133 This leads to a bizarre 
outcome if “early public disclosure [is] ‘the linchpin of the patent 
system.’”134 In some cases, disclosure plays second fiddle to conception 
of invention and diligent, though inefficient, work.135  
 
128. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 
284 (codified at scattered sections of 15, 28, 35, 42, and 51 U.S.C. (2012)).   
129. See Cristian Timmermann & Henk van den Belt, Intellectual Property 
and Global Health: From Corporate Social Responsibility to the Access to 
Knowledge Movement, 34 Liverpool L. Rev. 47 (2013). 
130. See, e.g., Daniel J. Sherwinter & Patrick M. Boucher, The America 
Invents Act, 41 Colo. Law. 47, 47 (2012). 
131. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–18 (2012). 
132. Id. § 102(a) (2006) (amended 2011).  
133. See id. § 102(g) (2006) (amended 2011), accord Griffith v. Konamaru, 816 
F.2d 624 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (examining the latter applicant’s justifications 
for delays and finding that applicant did not exercise “reasonable 
diligence”); see also Margo A. Bagley, The Need for Speed (and Grace): 
Issues in a First-Inventor-to-File World, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1035, 
1039 (2008) (“The second applicant . . . must show that not only was she 
the first to conceive the invention, but also that she diligently worked to 
reduce the invention to practice during the relevant time period.”). 
134. Griffith, 816 F.2d at 626 (quoting Horwath v. Lee, 564 F.2d 948, 950 
(C.C.P.A. 1977)  
135. Some argue that, because priority disputes were so rare, there was no need 
to alter the system. See Bagley, supra note 133, at 1040 (“Many aspects 
of the [first-to-invent] patent procurement process involve uncertainty 
that a move to [first-inventor-to-file] will not eliminate.”); see also Alexander 
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In contrast, the AIA’s “first-inventor-to-file” system reinvigorates 
early public disclosure by ignoring such priority disputes.136 The first-
inventor-to-file distinction notes that the filer must have actually 
invented what he seeks to patent.137 This distinction is important 
because the AIA adopted a pre-application “grace period” that enables 
disclosure of the invention without barring patenting.138 When an 
inventor discloses his discovery via a sale or other public use, the AIA 
permits a one-year grace period before filing a patent application so 
that inventors may validate their invention’s economic viability.139 
Accordingly, the AIA encourages prompt disclosure, limits waste of 
judicial or administrative resources used for interference proceedings, 
and avoids harmful, premature patent applications used to establish 
priority.140 
IPR accomplishes a similar benefit by addressing the long-felt 
need141 for expeditious review of “bad” patents.142 The USPTO has the 
authority to institute an IPR when the petitioner demonstrates a 
“reasonable likelihood” that one or more challenged claims are 
invalid.143 Petitioners can only challenge claims for lacking novelty or 
 
Poltorak, First-to-File vs. First to Invent, Intell. Prop. Today, Apr. 
2008, at 40 (discussing the differences between the first-to-invent and first-
inventor-to-file systems), available at http://www.generalpatent.com/ip_ 
 articles/Poltorak-IPToday-Apr2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6JL-KS6S]. 
136. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2012) (describing prior art and bars to 
patenting); cf. id. § 135 (providing for derivation proceedings to determine 
whether “an individual named in an earlier application as the inventor or 
a joint inventor derived such invention from an individual named in the 
petitioner’s application as the inventor or a joint inventor and, without 
authorization, the earlier application claiming such invention was filed.”). 
137. See id. § 102(b).  
138. See id. § 102(a)–(b). 
139. Id.; see also Helsinn Healthcare v. Teva Pharm. USA Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 
(2019). In Helsinn, the Court was asked to determine whether the AIA 
changed the long-standing meaning of “on-sale” by including a catch-all 
provision at the end of the newly amended statute. The Court held that 
the catch-all provision does not modify the meaning of “on-sale” for 
purposes of the patent code. Id. at 633–34. 
140. But see Poltorak, supra note 135, at 40–41 (discussing the concerns faced 
by individual inventors under the first-to-file systems). 
141. See Nard, supra note 60, at 764 (proposing the implementation of inter 
partes proceedings twelve years before Congress enacted the AIA). Nard 
explains that the inter partes proceeding will help embolden “proprietary 
and competitive certainty ex ante.” Id. 
142. H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 39–40 (2011). 
143. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012). 
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nonobviousness,144 and the USPTO must render a final written decision 
on all claims challenged within eighteen months after instituting IPR.145 
By creating IPR procedures, the AIA ostensibly codified the need for 
timely patentability decisions for patents that would otherwise keep 
inventions from the public.146 Unlike district court litigation—which 
often takes years,147 but allows judges to hold patents invalid for any 
reason defined by the Patent Act and permits a finding of 
noninfringement148—IPR provides narrow grounds for invalidating 
patents that should never have been granted.149 
II. Drug Regulation & Patent Law: The Hatch-
Waxman Act and Generic Competition 
Despite being labeled as an “incentives system,” the Patent Act 
remains agnostic towards the actual monetary value of patented 
inventions.150 A new, useful, and nonobvious invention is not guaranteed 
market success. Rather, it is the market that indicates which direction 
inventors should focus their efforts.151 Consequently, some industries 
favor trade secrecy and early-market entry in lieu of patenting when 
the market signals a preference for rapid innovation.152 
The pharmaceutical industry, however, favors patenting above all 
else.153 Since the mid-1980s, studies have consistently illustrated that 
most pharmaceutical technologies would not exist but for the patent 
 
144. Id. § 311(b). 
145. Id. § 316(a)(11); see also SAS Inst. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) (denying 
partial institution of IPR and also holding that the USPTO must institute 
IPR and render a written opinion on all claims challenged within the 
petition). 
146. See supra Part II.B. 
147. Joseph Berghammer & Charles Shifley, The Basics of US Patent Litigation, 
Banner & Witcoff (Oct. 1, 2002), https://bannerwitcoff.com/ media/ 
 _docs/library/articles/basiclit.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5EQ-QUR2]. 
148. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2012). 
149. H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 39–40 (2011). 
150. Nard, supra note 42, at 2–3 (describing the patent system as a utilitarian, 
incentives-based regime). 
151. Id. at 2. 
152. Id. at 3–4, 4 n.15. Industries such as the chemical processing and high-
technology Silicon Valley companies often favor trade secrecy above 
patents. See id. at 3. 
153. See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 
Mgmt. Sci. 173, 175 (1986). 
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system.154 This observation is a consequence of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act.155 
A. Pre-Hatch-Waxman Pharmaceutical Regulation 
Following the thalidomide birth-defect scare of the 1950s,156 
Congress amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)157 to 
require that the FDA test drugs for safety and efficacy.158 Under the 
1962 amendments to the FDCA, pharmaceutical companies were 
required to conduct multi-phase clinical trials before the FDA could 
approve a new drug for marketing.159 Pharmaceutical companies 
detailed the safety and efficacy studies in a New Drug Application 
(“NDA”), which the FDA would review before giving final approval.160 
The 1962 FDCA Amendments unintentionally eroded the patent 
terms of pioneer drugs161—drugs protected by a New Chemical Entity 
(“NCE”).162 Pioneer firms would patent an NCE to obtain priority as 
 
154. See Bhaven N. Sampat, A Survey of Empirical Evidence on Patents and 
Innovation 5 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25383, 
2018) (noting that over 60% of pharmaceutical innovations are attributed 
solely to the existence of the patent system). 
155. See id. 
156. Michael Winerip, The Death and Afterlife of Thalidomide, N.Y. Times 
(Sept. 23, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/booming/the-
death-and-afterlife-of-thalidomide.html [https://perma.cc/HA3M-TLPV].  
157. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–95 (2012)). 
158. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–81 (2012)). 
159. Lisa C. Will, Accelerated FDA Approval of Investigational New Drugs: 
Hope for Seriously Ill Patients, 94 Dick. L. Rev. 1037, 1039–41 (1990). 
160. Id. at 1040. 
161. Elizabeth S. Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: 
History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 Antitrust L.J. 585, 588 (2003). 
162. Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming the Hatch-Waxman System: How 
Pioneer Drug Makers Exploit the Law to Maintain Monopoly Power in 
the Prescription Drug Market, 29 J. Legis. 21, 23–24, 24 n.12 (2003); see 
also Ryan Timmins, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: 
Potential Problems in the Biologic-Drug Regulatory Scheme, 13 Nw. J. 
Tech. & Intell. Prop. 215, 216–17 (2015) (explaining the differences 
between small-molecule compounds, governed by Hatch-Waxman, and 
more recent legislation dedicated to “biologics,” therapeutic compounds 
such as insulin that cannot be made using ordinary methods). This Note 
addresses only small-molecule drugs. Furthermore, patents may cover 
aspects of a pharmaceutical product that are not the NCE. See infra Part 
IV(A)(ii).  
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first inventor,163 but the new safety and efficacy requirements postponed 
pioneer drug sales by several years, cutting into the patent’s seventeen-
year exclusivity term.164 
Conversely, generic drugs benefitted by the FDA’s Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (“ANDA”), upon which generics could rely on a 
pioneer drug’s safety and efficacy data for an expedited approval 
pathway.165 Generic drugs would receive automatic approval if their 
ANDAs demonstrated “bioequivalency” with an approved pioneer.166 
ANDAs, however, applied only to pre-1962 pioneer drugs;167 post-1962 
generics were considered “new drugs,” and generic manufacturers were 
required to submit supplemental data, similar to an NDA, before 
receiving FDA approval.168 As a result, over 150 drugs with expired 
patents did not have any generic competition in 1984.169 
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 premised as a 
compromise between generics and pioneers. Specifically, the Act reflects 
“a balance between two potentially competing policy interests—
inducing pioneering development of pharmaceutical formulations and 
methods and facilitating efficient transition to a market with low-cost, 
generic copies of those pioneering inventions.”170 To strike this balance,  
163. Notwithstanding the “first to invent” system under pre-AIA law, patent 
policy still favored early disclosure and dissemination of ideas. See Apotex 
USA, Inc. v. Merck & Co., 254 F.3d 1031, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For 
example, suppression or concealment of an invention could prevent an 
inventor from obtaining or enforcing a patent covering the concealed 
invention. Id. at 1035. Circumstantial evidence could lead to a reasonable 
inference of suppression or concealment if there was “an unreasonable 
delay in filing a patent application.” Id. at 1038. In the pharmaceutical 
context, the delay period began once test results were “reasonably 
indicative of the desired [pharmacological] response.” Fujikawa v. 
Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Nelson v. 
Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980)). Importantly, any 
pharmacological response—irrespective of the drug’s intended use or 
undiscovered properties—could trigger the delay period. Id. 
164. Powell-Bullock, supra note 162, at 23–24. 
165. Weiswasser & Danis, supra note 161, at 589. 
166. Id.  
167. Id.  
168. Id. at 589–90. 
169. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1 (1984); see also Gerald J. Mossinghoff, 
Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug 
Development Process, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 187, 187 (1999). 
170. Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharma. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1360 
(Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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Congress relied on the patent system’s incentives regime in an 
unprecedented commingling of two otherwise independent bodies of 
law. 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, pioneers still must submit an NDA 
comprising the results of clinical trials for both safety and efficacy.171 
Pioneers must also include the information of any patent that may 
“reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged 
in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”172 Once the FDA approves 
the NDA, the relevant patent information is listed in the Approved 
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, also known 
as the “Orange Book.”173 Patents listed there are subject to Patent 
Term Extensions.174 
The Patent Term Extension was seen as a way to promote 
innovation,175 and it directly addressed pioneer firms’ complaints about 
the lengthy regulatory process that resulted from the 1962 Amendments 
to the FDCA.176 Under both pre-AIA and current U.S. patent law, 
patents have a term of approximately seventeen years.177 Prior to the 
1962 Amendments, however, pioneer drugs enjoyed full  patent terms—
meaning that pioneers could profit from their drug without fearing 
generic competition for the patent’s entire duration.178 Under the 
current FDA requirements, clinical testing can stall drug approval for 
several years, and pioneer drugs cannot commercialize their patent until 
the FDA grants the NDA.179 In the meantime, pioneers must still obtain 
patent protection because certain actions, including public use or offers 
 
171. Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch-Waxman 
Scheme on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 168–74 (2005) (describing the intricacies of the 
Orange Book and other Hatch-Waxman provisions). 
172. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
173. Derzko, supra note 171, at 169. 
174. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2012). 
175. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for 
Presumptive Illegality, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 37, 62 (2009).   
176. Id. at 44–46. 
177. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 Yale J. Health 
Pol’y, Law, & Ethics 717, 723 n.20 (2005). 
178. See Carrier, supra note 175, at 44 (describing seventeen-year patent term 
for pre-AIA pharmaceutical patents). 
179. See id. (describing how FDA approval of an application typically takes 
two years, and how clinical investigations for approval of new dosages and 
new uses of pre-existing drugs have a three-year period of exclusivity 
because of how long they take).  
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for sale, may constitute a patent-defeating event.180 Thus, Patent Term 
Extensions allow pioneer drugs to reclaim effective patent terms by 
accounting for the amount of the patent’s term spent in pre-market 
clinical testing and awaiting FDA approval.181 
The Hatch-Waxman Act also overhauled the generic approval 
process and the use of ANDAs. Because anyone who “makes, uses, or 
sells” a patented invention infringes the patent, the Hatch-Waxman 
Act created an exception to generic companies preparing an ANDA.182 
Additionally, upon establishing bioequivalence183 to an Orange Book–
listed pioneer drug, the generic company must make at least one of the 
following four certifications: (1) there are no Orange Book patents for 
the pioneer counterpart; (2) the Orange Book patents are expired; (3) 
the Orange Book patents will be expired by the time the FDA approves 
the generic; or (4) the Orange Book patents are invalid or will not be 
infringed.184 
The fourth listed certification, a “Paragraph IV” certification, 
constitutes an artificial infringement action and requires a pioneer drug 
manufacturer to commence an infringement action against the ANDA 
filer within forty-five days of receiving the required notice letter.185 
Otherwise, the FDA may approve the generic if the regulatory 
requirements are met.186 
If the pioneer company commences an infringement action against 
the ANDA filer, the FDA must stay approval of the ANDA for thirty 
 
180. See supra note 139. 
181. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2012) (setting out rules for patent-term 
extensions). See also Carrier, supra note 175, at 47. 
182. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”); 
see also Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that 
experimental-use exception does not apply to another's testing of a 
patented compound for FDA approval). 
183. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.3 (2005) (defining “bioequivalency” generally as the 
“absence of a significant difference in the rate and extent to which the active 
ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents . . . becomes 
available at the site of drug action”); see also Timothy O’Shea, Debunking 
a Common Pharmacy Myth: The 80-125% Bioequivalence Rule, 
Pharmacy Times (Aug. 6, 2016, 2:51 PM), https://pharmacytimes.com/ 
 contributor/timothy-o-shea/2016/06/debunking-a-common-pharmacy-myth-
the-80-125-bioequivalence-rule [https://perma.cc/5KPU-TYQ5] (describing 
how the FDA conducts and analyzes bioequivalency studies). 
184. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012). 
185. Id. §§ 355(j)(2)(iii), 271(e)(2). 
186. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
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months.187 But if the ANDA filer prevails on a Paragraph IV 
certification, that generic enjoys 180 days of market exclusivity, during 
which the FDA cannot approve any other ANDAs.188 This regulatory-
exclusivity period forms a duopoly between the generic and pioneer, 
during which the generic attempts to maximize profits by offering its 
drug at a price marginally lower than the pioneer’s.189 As a result, 
generic sales made during the exclusivity period often account for a 
majority of the generic company’s profits for the respective drug.190  
Consumers, on the other hand, do not benefit from a successful 
Paragraph IV certification until after the generic’s market exclusivity 
ends. Once that initial 180-day period expires, other generics can 
quickly enter the market without facing ANDA-related stays.191 The 
increased competition thus results in lower prescription-drug prices for 
consumers.192 
III. The Effects of Hatch-Waxman on Generic 
Availability and Access to Affordable Drugs 
The Hatch-Waxman Act has succeeded in increasing generic 
availability. Only 18.6% of prescription drug sales were attributable to 
generics in 1984.193 By 2010, studies indicated that generics accounted 
for 78% of all prescriptions.194 Despite a persistent increase in generic 
availability, critics still lament the pharmaceutical industry’s ability to 
 
187. Id.  
188. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I–II).  
189. Martin Voet, The Generic Challenge: Understanding Patents, 
FDA and Pharmaceutical Life-Cycle Management 123 (5th ed. 
2016) (noting that the “single incentive” of market exclusivity, arising 
from a successful Paragraph IV certification, encourages generic firms to 
operate under the “law of averages”; that is, Paragraph IV certification 
success presumptively correlates to the number of challenges). 
190. Id. 
191. This assumes that the new generic “copies” the original ANDA filer and 
that the pioneer will not commence a frivolous law suit.   
192. See C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity, 77 
Antitrust L.J. 947, 954 (2011). 
193. Xiangnong Wang, Understanding Current Trends and Outcomes in 
Generic Drug Patent Litigation: An Empirical Investigation 11 (June 27, 
2012) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Stanford University), available at https:// 
 papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2094545 [https://perma.cc/ 
 9AUN-778N].  
194. Id. 
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maintain market exclusivity well beyond the patent’s original term.195 
And anticompetitive behaviors that inhibit generic entry—such as 
“evergreening,” authorized generics, and reverse settlements—rely on 
the Hatch-Waxman Act’s contortion of the patent system to the 
public’s detriment. 
A. Types of Anticompetitive Behavior 
Before proceeding, it is important to define anticompetitive 
behavior as something more than market exclusivity. For example, the 
180-day generic-exclusivity period is not anticompetitive because 
consumers still benefit, even if only marginally, from newly-accessible 
generics. Instead, anticompetitive behavior in pharmaceutical market–
ing exhibits similar qualities to bad patents in that it takes away 
something useful from the public. Pioneer pharmaceutical companies 
exhibit anticompetitive behavior through several tactics, collectively 
referred to as “Pharmaceutical Life Cycle Management.”196 
1. Authorized Generics 
“Authorized Generics” are pioneer drugs marketed under the guise 
of a generic name, often via a pioneer’s licensing the drug to a third 
party.197 Because the pioneer already received FDA approval for the 
licensed drug, Authorized Generics can compete with an ANDA generic 
during its 180-day exclusivity period.198 Authorized Generics lower the 
ANDA generic’s price and revenue—which pioneers contend is 
procompetitive—while undermining the purpose of the 180-day market 
exclusivity period.199 Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
acknowledged that generic companies expect pioneer firms to introduce 
Authorized Generics in response to a Paragraph IV certification.200 The 
threat of Authorized Generics has even prevented generic companies 
 
195. See, e.g., Simon Wentworth, Can Pharma Defend the Way it Defends 
Patents?, LinkedIn: Pulse (Mar. 3, 2019), https://www.linkedin.com/ 
 pulse/can-pharma-defend-way-defends-patents-simon-wentworth/ [https:// 
 perma.cc/HS7D-HMDF]; see also supra notes 175–177 and accompanying 
text. 
196. See Voet, supra note 189, at 1–6 (introducing life-cycle management and 
the role of the patent system). 
197. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Authorized Generic Drugs: Short-Term 
Effects and Long-Term Impact 1 n.1 (2011). 
198. Id. at 1. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 38. 
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from filing Paragraph IV certification—believing that litigation costs 
would exceed prospective profits.201 
The use of Authorized Generics to discourage ANDA filings is the 
least explicit anticompetitive tactic exploited by pioneer firms. 
Empirical studies indicate that Authorized Generics have not affected 
ANDA filing rates in a meaningful way.202 And the FTC suggests that 
Authorized Generics, absent other anticompetitive tactics, may benefit 
consumers by providing more competition during 180-day generic 
exclusivity periods.203 
2. Evergreening 
Through a practice referred to as “evergreening,” or “product 
hopping,”204 pioneer firms leverage the patent system to extend their 
market exclusivity by patenting a drug’s different features as that new 
drug undergoes clinical trials.205 
For example, in the NDA, a pioneer company may attempt to 
patent the drug’s active chemical compound.206 If the FDA has never 
approved an NDA directed to that compound, the active chemical is 
dubbed an NCE.207 Patents covering an expected NCE afford the best 
protection because they confer broad and strong exclusivity.208 A 
common strategy is to first patent the general compound, broadly 
protecting the drug product irrespective of its use, formulation, or even 
 
201. Id. The FTC admits, however, that Authorized Generics may not deter 
some generic firms from filing Paragraph IV certifications. Id. 
202. Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 192, at 982. 
203. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 197, at 38. 
204. See Roger Collier, Drug Patents: The Evergreening Problem, 185 Can. 
Med. Ass’n J. E385 (2013) (describing pharmaceutical patent “evergreening” 
and its policy concerns); Gregory H. Jones et al., Strategies that Delay or 
Prevent the Timely Availability of Affordable Generic Drugs in the United 
States, 127 Blood J. 1398, 1399 (2015) (explaining how state laws allow 
for “evergreening” or “product-hopping”). Abbot is explicitly mentioned 
as utilizing product-hopping, costing Americans approximately 700 million 
dollars per year for fenofibrate. Id. 
205. Voet, supra note 189, at 160–62. 
206. Id. at 160.  
207. Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 192, at 982 n.144. 
208. Id. (“In the case of new chemical entities (drugs that contain no active 
ingredient previously approved by the FDA), generic challengers must wait 
to submit an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification until four years after 
the brand-name approval.”) (emphasis added). Voet, supra note 189, at 
71–72. 
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quantity.209 Then, a pioneer will patent the particular compound—
usually a specific salt or ester of the original compound—that will 
become the active ingredient in the approved NCE.210 
Additionally, an FDA-approved NCE confers a “data-exclusivity” 
period where ANDA filers cannot rely on the pioneer’s safety or efficacy 
data for approval.211 The exclusivity period lasts at least four years and 
applies to all data related to the NCE, including trial-determined 
formulations and doses.212 
As the NCE progresses through clinical trials, pioneer firms patent 
therapeutically-effective doses and formulations.213 Likewise, pioneers 
may patent an NCE’s enantiomers—identically structured but mirror-
image forms of a compound—or combination products, which include 
yet another off-patent compound.214 Pioneers may also seek patent 
protection for alterations in drug delivery and drug synthesis.215 But 
perhaps the most-common trend in follow-on innovation is the practice 
of reformulating drugs for sustained one-a-day administration.216 
Patent evergreening is problematic because the societal benefits of 
follow-on patents do not justify their costs to consumers.217 Follow-on 
patents are “weaker” and are likely obvious innovations made as a 
matter of course.218 Because the FDA does not inquire into the strength 
of Orange Book patents, follow-on patents shift costs—namely, 
 
209. Voet, supra note 189, at 72; see also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. 
Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding unclaimed 
quantity of pharmaceutical compound did not render claim indefinite). 
But see Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 911 (2014) 
(“To tolerate imprecision . . . would diminish the definiteness 
requirement’s public-notice function and foster the innovation-
discouraging ‘zone of uncertainty’”). 
210. Voet, supra note 189, at 72. 
211. Id. at 117. 
212. Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 192, at 982 n.144 (citing 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012)). 
213. Voet, supra note 189, at 117–20. 
214. Annabelle C. Fowler, Pharmaceutical Line Extensions in the United States 
8–11 (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.nber.org/aging/ 
 valmed/WhitePaper-Fowler10.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/QWC8-RB99]. 
215. Voet, supra note 189, at 160–61. 
216. Id.; see also Tony Ellery & Neal Hansen, Pharmaceutical Lifecycle 
Management: Making the Most of Each and Every Brand 116–
18 (2012). 
217. See Fowler, supra note 214, at 12–14 (outlining previous research regarding 
the strength of follow-on patents). 
218. Id.; see Nard, supra note 42, at 329. 
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litigation costs—to generic companies while pioneers continue to collect 
their economic rent.219 
Even if a generic prevails on a Paragraph IV certification, and 
invalidates a patent that blocked generic competition, state drug-
product-substitution (“DPS”) laws create another barrier to generic 
entry. State DPS laws allow, or sometimes require, pharmacists to 
substitute pioneer drugs with the equivalent generic versions.220 All fifty 
states have DPS laws that require the generic substitute to have the 
same therapeutic rating as the pioneer drug.221 By making minor 
changes to the pioneer drug—i.e., reformulating a tablet as a capsule—
the generic versions are no longer therapeutically equivalent.222 Generics 
would then need to file a new ANDA to compete with the reformulated 
pioneer drug.223 
3. Reverse Settlements 
A reverse settlement occurs when a pioneer pays a generic company 
to delay market entry prompted by a Paragraph IV certification.224 
Because patent litigation is expensive and uncertain, pioneer and 
generic firms enter into reverse-settlement agreements to decrease both 
parties’ risks.225 The pioneer maintains market exclusivity and the 
generic receives guaranteed revenue—both at the expense of the 
 
219. Fowler, supra note 214, at 4 (“[Follow-ons] do not require duplication of 
the R&D that was needed to develop the products active ingredient. 
Precisely because line extensions have the same active ingredient as an 
original product, line extensions and original products are typically in the 
same therapeutic class and are imperfect substitutes.”). Such behavior is 
the epitome of “rent seeking.” See Nard, supra note 60, at 768 n.42; see 
also Voet, supra note 189, at 158–59 (discussing the FTC’s view on 
evergreening). 
220. Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: 
The Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 1009, 1017 
(2010). 
221. Id. at 1017–18. 
222. Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New 
Framework, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 167, 171 (2016) (defining “product-
hopping” as “reformulating the product in a way that makes a generic 
version of the original product not substitutable”). 
223. Id. 
224. Carrier, supra note 220, at 1014. 
225. Id. 
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public.226 The increasing saliency of reverse settlements prompted the 
FTC to evaluate the types and harms of reverse settlements.227 
According to a recent study, typical consumers might pay 1,400% 
more for drugs that would otherwise face generic competition but for 
reverse settlements.228 Studies also indicate that reverse settlements 
take many forms.229 For instance, a pioneer firm can pay a generic to 
delay market entry until after the Orange Book patents expire.230 These 
so-called “pay-for-delay” settlements delay generic competition for an 
average of seventeen months, costing consumers billions each year.231 
In 2013, the Supreme Court acknowledged the problems created by 
reverse-settlement agreements. In FTC v. Actavis,232 the Court 
determined that reverse-settlement agreements may violate antitrust 
laws. The Court also found that patent law’s exclusionary principle 
does not shield a pioneer from antitrust liability.233 In reaching these 
conclusions, the Court reasoned that reverse settlements delaying 
generic competition contradict the Hatch-Waxman Act’s purpose.234 
Notably, the Court did not suggest that reverse settlements are 
categorically unreasonable. Rather, the Court instructed district courts 
to employ a standard antitrust test—the “rule of reason” test—to 
punish actions that unreasonably restrict trade.235 Germane to this 
finding, the Court noted that a presumption that the reverse settlement 
is unlawful applies only where “an observer with even a rudimentary 
understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in 
question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and 
 
226. Id. (explaining that pioneers and generic firms align their interests 
through reverse settlements). 
227. Robin C. Feldman & Prianka Misra, The Fatal Attraction of Pay-for-
Delay, 18 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 249, 251 (2019); see also 
Raymond J. Prince, Pay-for-Delay: How Brand-Name and Generic 
Pharmaceutical Drug Companies Collude and Cost Consumers Billions, 
68 S.C. L. Rev. 689, 694–700 (2017) (conducting antitrust analysis of 
pay-for-delay settlements). 
228. See Generic Pharm. Ass’n, 2016 Generic Drug Savings & Access 
in The United States Report 11 (2016), available at https://www 
 .gphaonline.org/media/generic-drug-savings-2016/index.html [https:// 
 perma.cc/83X7-96WF]. 
229. Feldman & Misra, supra note 227, at 262.  
230. Id. at 262–65 (discussing various pay-for-delay strategies). 
231. Id. at 256–57. 
232. 570 U.S. 136 (2013). 
233. Id. at 147–48. 
234. Id. at 152–53. 
235. Id. at 159–160. 
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markets.”236 Because the potential anticompetitive effect depends on 
multiple variables—including the payment’s size, its scope compared to 
future litigation costs, and the pioneer’s justification for the payment—
the Court rejected the FTC’s burden-shifting argument.237 
Following Actavis, the FTC identified three categories of reverse-
payment settlements: (1) no restrictions on entry; (2) restrictions on 
entry plus compensation that constitutes potential pay-for-delay; and 
(3) restrictions on entry without explicit compensation.238 The FTC 
does not clearly delineate these categories, prompting scholars to define 
an unnamed “Category X” to encompass agreements that do not fit 
neatly within any of the named categories.239 Category X settlements 
include agreements that restrict generic entry without providing 
compensation—agreements comprising a “delay” without an explicit 
“pay.”240 For instance, certain agreements may permit generic 
competition if the generic company agrees to pay royalty fees to the 
pioneer.241 If the pioneer introduces an Authorized Generic, the royalty 
fee decreases.242 Taken together, such reverse settlements would increase 
generic price—with the royalty fee diminishing the generic’s revenue—
while simultaneously discouraging Authorized Generics that otherwise 
decrease drug costs. As some suggest, Category X settlements 
demonstrate that pioneers and generic firms are becoming more adept 
at disguising reverse settlements to escape antitrust scrutiny.243 Even 
more troubling, Category X settlements have grown since the Actavis 
decision.244 
B. Parallel Behavior and the Patent System 
Critics on all sides lament the Hatch-Waxman Act’s shortcomings. 
Many contend that Congress should address the pharmaceutical-price 
crisis by enacting pro-generic legislation.245 Others believe that Hatch-
 
236. Id. at 159. 
237. Id. 
238. Feldman & Misra, supra note 227, at 263. 
239. Id. at 264–65.  
240. Id. 
241. Id. at 265–66. 
242. Id.  
243. Id. at 265. 
244. Id. at 264–65. 
245. See, e.g., Jonathan Lapook, Forced Switch? Drug Cos. Develop Maneuvers 
to Hinder Generic Competition, CBS News (Aug. 28, 2014, 8:40 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/drug-companies-develop-maneuvers-to-
hinder-generic-competition/ [https://perma.cc/QP64-KVUT] (interviewing 
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Waxman overcompensated by giving generic firms too much power.246 
In either case, the flaw is the same: the Act incentivizes profiteering. 
Moreover, Hatch-Waxman undermines incentives that the patent 
system otherwise encourages, namely, the incentives to invent, disclose, 
and innovate. 
Hatch-Waxman undermines the incentive to invent by weakening 
patents. Patent Term Extensions do not sufficiently obviate regulatory 
delays. At most, Patent Term Extensions limit a pioneer’s effective 
patent term to fourteen years.247 Arrow’s Paradox alludes to this precise 
issue—pioneer firms cannot adequately externalize their internalities 
without a sufficient right to exclude.248 Because pharmaceutical research 
and development costs billions of dollars, which are often wasted if the 
FDA does not approve an NDA, pioneers rely on blockbuster drugs to 
compensate for other failed drug studies.249 Accordingly, diminished 
patent terms decrease the value of such research.250 
Similarly, the Hatch-Waxman Act neuters the incentive to innovate 
because the FDA’s clerical role in Orange Book patents creates an 
implied preliminary injunction via a thirty-month ANDA stay. 
Evergreening and reverse payments encourage settlements, which, in 
turn, discourage generic competition.251 To this end, Hatch-Waxman 
 
patients following forced-switch induced price hike, blaming pioneer firms for 
harming generic competition) [https://perma.cc/QP64-KVUT]; Center for 
Biosimilars, House Passes CREATES, 2 Other Bills Targeting High Drug 
Prices, Ctr. Biosimilars (May 29, 2019), https://www.centerforbiosimilars 
 .com/news/house-passes-creates-2-other-bills-targeting-high-drug-prices 
[https://perma.cc/K9DY-2CZ2] (describing the Association of Accessible 
Medicines’ support for the 2019 Creating and Restoring Equal Access to 
Equivalent Samples Act, which would permit generic drug developers to 
sue pioneer firms if the pioneer firms do not provide enough samples of a 
drug product for testing purposes). 
246. See generally Emily M. Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical 
Competition Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 Fordham Intell. Prop. 
Media & Ent. L.J. 245 (2012) (taking the position that the Hatch-
Waxman Act unduly harms pioneer firms). 
247. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(3) (2012) (limiting Patent Term Extensions 
to a 14-year maximum patent life), with id. § 154(a)(2) (stating that the 
patent grant “shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the 
patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application 
for the patent was filed”). 
248. See supra text accompanying notes 57–63. 
249. Morris, supra note 246, at 259 (further noting that only 30% of pioneer 
drugs' revenues turn a profit). 
250. Id. at 257–59. 
251. See supra Part IV.A. 
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often aligns pioneers’ and generic firms’ interests.252 Thus, Hatch-
Waxman incentivizes legal innovation to avoid antitrust laws, but it 
discourages less-certain scientific innovation. 
Finally, Hatch-Waxman undercuts the incentive to disclose by 
offering pioneers exclusivity over certain data that they provide to the 
FDA.253 These FDA-administered data rights have been referred to as 
“pseudo-patents” for the monopoly power they confer to pioneer 
brands.254 For instance, pioneers may—as their patents expire—
attempt to make a prescription medication available “over the counter.” 
To make that switch, pioneers must provide data to the FDA that 
demonstrates the safety and efficacy of over-the-counter use. Because 
the over-the-counter market essentially eviscerates the prescription 
market, the “pseudo-patent” further delays generic competition.255 This 
entire process is susceptible to gamesmanship because data exclusivity 
runs independent of patent rights. And so pioneers are not incentivized 
to provide this data until later.256  
IV. Correcting the Pharmaceutical Industry by 
Realigning the Hatch-Waxman Act with 
Contemporary Patent-Law Doctrine 
Understanding that the Hatch-Waxman Act’s statutory scheme 
leads to anticompetitive behavior and absurd results,257 Congress should 
enact legislation that encourages socially beneficial behavior on the part 
of both pioneer and generic firms. Admittedly, ex ante policy 
justifications struggle to address all downstream behaviors. That is why 
Congress should hesitate before distancing the pharmaceutical industry 
from the Patent Code—as others have suggested258—and instead use 
 
252. See Feldman & Misra, supra note 227, at 254–56. 
253. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii) (2012). 
254. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 
Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 345, 359 (2007).  
255. Id. at 360.  
256. Voet, supra note 189, at 100–01. 
257. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
258. See Ryan Davis, Waxman Opposes Hatch Plan to Keep Generics Out of 
PTAB, Law360 (Oct. 30, 2018, 7:22 PM), https://www.law360.com/ 
 articles/1095340/waxman-opposes-hatch-plan-to-keep-generics-out-of-ptab 
[https://perma.cc/U9TF-23J4]. In a dramatic exchange, the Hatch-
Waxman Act’s namesakes disagreed over generic firms’ use of IPRs to 
invalidate patents. Former-representative Waxman opposed Hatch’s plan 
to prevent generic firms from using IPR, stating “[i]t’s not going to 
improve [the Act] according to Waxman, it may according to Hatch.” Id. 
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patent policy to guide subsequent Hatch-Waxman legislation. Patent 
law’s unique nature promotes innovation by allowing decentralized 
behavior to make ex ante choices rather than constraining harmful 
decisions through ex post legislation.259 
Congress can accomplish those goals in three ways. First, Congress 
should strengthen and redefine the IPR procedure. This solution 
addresses the main problem areas created by the disconnect between 
the Hatch-Waxman Act and patent law generally. An IPR quickly 
disposes of patents that stymie innovation. Because an IPR must issue 
a final written decision within eighteen months of its institution, generic 
firms can invalidate bad patents sooner.260 This may prevent, or at least 
reduce, product hopping because pioneers could not obtain patents at 
a rate commensurate to IPR resolution.261 Additionally, limiting 
product hopping will also decrease reverse settlements, as pioneers place 
greater value on market-entry timing.262 Thus, generic firms gain 
bargaining power that pioneers may not sufficiently compensate in a 
reverse settlement. On the opposite end, IPRs also benefit worthy 
patents. Orange Book patent listings upheld through IPR strengthen 
the pioneer’s bargaining power.263 Indeed, studies indicate that pioneers 
and generic firms receive equal treatment at IPR.264 Consequently, IPR 
provides an overall benefit by rewarding pioneers who create worthy, 
nonobvious drugs, while simultaneously expediting generic competition 
and reducing dilatory settlements. 
Second, Congress should prohibit regulatory exclusivity on NCEs 
and provide pioneers with fully-restored patent terms upon the FDA’s 
 
259. Nard, supra note 42, at 1–6. 
260. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
261. See Gzybowski, supra note 83. 
262. Carrier, supra note 220, at 1035 (noting that “[a]bsent settlement, there 
is a chance that generic firms could successfully challenge the brand firm’s 
patent . . . allow[ing] immediate generic entry . . . pharmacists could offer 
[generics] . . . before the brand firm is able to switch”). 
263. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2012) (“The petitioner in an inter partes review 
of a claim in a patent . . . that results in a final written decision . . . may 
not assert either in a civil action . . . that the claim is invalid on any 
ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during 
that inter partes review.”).  Similar to issue preclusion, “a real party in 
interest or privy with the petitioner” is also estopped from relitigating a 
patent’s validity on the same grounds raised in the IPR.  Id.; see 
also Nard, supra note 60, at 795 (discussing the effects of oppositional 
proceedings on proprietary and competitive certainty ex ante). 
264. Tulip Mahaseth, Maintaining the Balance: An Empirical Study on Inter 
Partes Review Outcomes of Orange Book Patents and its Effect on Hatch-
Waxman Litigation 1, 22–23 (Nov. 29, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
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approval of an NDA. By removing regulatory exclusivity, generics could 
enter the market immediately upon pioneer entry if the pioneer’s new 
compound relies on a bad patent.265 Providing full patent-term 
restoration will also encourage pioneers to focus on inventive activity, 
as opposed to the current regime’s patent-quantity-over-quality 
values.266 Similarly, Hatch-Waxman incentivizes pioneers to be less 
inventive.267 
Finally, Congress should update Hatch-Waxman to reconcile it 
with the changes implemented by the AIA. Such changes could include: 
(1) giving effect to IPR for Paragraph IV certifications;268 (2) requiring 
that the FDA actively monitor Orange Book patents; or (3) clarifying 
which actions constitute patent-defeating conduct during NDA 
preparation.269 Because the FDA and USPTO act independently, clearly 
defined boundaries could obviate idiosyncratic behavior that leads to 
absurd results. 
Conclusion 
Given the trend of anticompetitive behavior within the 
pharmaceutical industry, it is important to understand the sources that 
encourage societal harm. Pharmaceutical companies routinely use the 
patent system to deprive the public of useful and affordable medicines. 
Such behavior would not be possible without the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
which mistakenly focuses on the patent system’s means rather than its 
ends. Accordingly, Congress should resort to foundational patent-law 
principles—the incentives to invent, disclose, and innovate—if it hopes 
to salvage the pharmaceutical industry. Indeed, realigning the Hatch-
Waxman Act and the patent system would promote innovation without 
further harming consumers. After all, we should be wary of “clear[ing] 
away a fence just because we cannot see its point.”270  
 
 
265. Assuming that generic firms can invalidate the patent before FDA-
approval. 
266. See supra Part III. 
267. See supra Part II.B. 
268. The current regime requires a final action in district court. 21 C.F.R. §§ 
314.107(b), .108(b)(3) (2019). Generics must submit proof of judgement 
to the FDA to obtain regulatory approval. Id. § 314.107(e). 
269. Helsinn provides an example of “elliptical” statutory phrasing that harms 
pioneers. Helsinn Healthcare v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 2678 
(2019). 
270. Artis v. D.C., 138 S. Ct. 594, 608 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Even 
if a fence doesn’t seem to have a reason, sometimes all that means is we 
need to look more carefully for the reason it was built in the first place.”). 
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